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Blount: Blount: Family Partnerships: Who Must Recognize the Taxable Income

FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS: WHO MUST
RECOGNIZE THE TAXABLE INCOME?
LARRY E. BLOUNT*

The partnership is often employed as the organizational structure for
conducting family business. As a tax conduit,' it escapes taxation at the
entity level, and has great utility and flexibility for the allocation of
business income and losses. Such attributes serve to make the partnership
well suited to accommodate the often complex business dealings among
family members.
The partnership business organizational form is appealing to the family, also, because of its utility as an income-splitting device. Often a wealthy
family unit can reduce its aggregate tax liability by transferring incomeproducing property to a family partnership and giving partnership interests to family members. Properly structured, such transactions can shift
income from higher to lower bracket taxpayers, effectively reducing income tax liability but not the income level of the economic unit. 2 For the
most part, this is a legally sanctioned means of tax avoidance. 3
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia; B.A., Michigan, 1972;
J.D., Cincinnati, 1975; LL.M., Columbia, 1976.
1. A tax conduit is an entity that is not subject to income taxation. Its income is attributed to its owner who, in turn, pays the income tax. Partnership income is attributed to its partners, generally, in proportion to their ownership interest in the partnership and included in their gross income for tax purposes.
Thus, the entity serves as a "conduit" through which income flows and is not a
taxpayer itself. Other entities which to some extent are tax conduits include subchapter S corporations, trusts, estates, regulated investment companies, real
estate investment trusts, insurance companies and farm cooperatives.
2. See A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHIPS AND INCOME TAXES (1970); J. PENNELL &J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 270-84 (1970); Beck, Use of the Family Partnershipas Our Operating
Device-The New Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 603 (1954); Landis,
Utility and Effect of the Partnershipin Family Planning, 24 N.Y.U. INST. FED.

TAX. 339 (1966); Rothernburg, Minors in Family PartnershipsSince 1954, 46
TAXES 17 (1968); Thorson, Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy
over the Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAXJ. 113 (1965); Note, Income Splitting as a Means of Avoiding Taxes, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1966);
Comment, Family Partnershipsand the Revenue Act of 1951, 61 YALE L.J. 541
(1952), for discussion of the principles and techniques related to income splitting.
3. Stanback v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1959); Neil v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1959); Finlen v. Healy, 187 F. Supp. 434 (D.
Mont. 1960); Leo A. Woodbury, 49 T.C. 180 (1967); Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261
(1959); C. Turner, 24 TAX. CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 544, (1965);J. O'Donnell, Jr.,
23 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 210 (1964); I.R.C. § 704(e) and accompanying
Treasury Regulations.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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Substance and not merely the form of such transactions will determine
the ownership of interests in family partnerships. 4 Income from such property will be attributed to the taxpayer who actually owns it. 5 Income may
be split only by shifting the ownership of the underlying income producing
property. 6 The principle of progressivity so firmly established in our income tax system, would be severely frustrated if partnerships could freely
be employed as income splitting devices.
It therefore becomes necessary to establish rules designed to
distinguish legitimate family partnership arrangements from sham transactions that manifest unacceptable tax avoidance objectives. Gratuitous
transfers of interests in family partnerships will often have bona fide objectives and the law should not be construed so as to discourage their occurrance. However, the federal fisc must be protected from imaginative
income-splitting efforts involving family partnerships.
Section 704(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1951,
represents Congress' effort to balance the competing interests in this area.
Generally, its rules provide that a person will be recognized as a partner for
federal income tax purposes if he owns a capital interest 7 in a partnership
in which capital is a material income-producing factor. 8 It does not matter
whether such interest was acquired by purchase or by gift.9
Generally, these provisions establish a non-exclusive safe harbor for
taxpayers who seek recognition as a partner for federal income tax purposes.' 0 This safe harbor is non-exclusive because it only provides protection for taxpayers who own interests in partnerships in which capital is a
material income-producing factor.' However, non-compliance with the
conditions found in section 704(e)(1) does not conclusively establish that
partnership status will not be recognized.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS UNDER SECTION 704(e).

Section 704(e) codifies several case law principles designed to limit income splitting for tax avoidance purposes. Section 704(e) reflects the prin4. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(i) (1976).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(i) (1976).
6. Id.

7. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v) (1976) defines "capital interest" for these
purposes as an interest in the assets of a partnership, which is distributable to its

owner upon his withdrawl from the partnership or upon its liquidation. A mere
right to participate in the partership profits alone is not a capital interest.
8. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv) (1976), capital is a material

income-producing factor if a substantial portion of a partnership's income is attributable to the employment of capital in its business. Manufacturing or real
estate businesses usually meet this materiality requirement, where personal services businesses do not. Whether capital is a material income-producing factor is
determined by reference to all the facts and circumstances of each case.
9. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1).
10.

See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION

PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS

14.02 (1977).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
11. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1).
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ciple that personal service income is taxable to the person who earns it.
12
Generally, it provides that the distributive share of the partner who received his interest gratuitously shall not include income attributable to services
rendered to the partnership by his donor. '1
In most cases, income derived from the ownership of incomeproducing property is attributed, for tax purposes, to the owner of such
property.1 4 This principle is codified under present law which provides
that a partner who receives his interest gratuitously cannot receive a
distributive share of partnership income that exceeds the amount attributable to his donor's capital contribution.' 5 Generally, the donee in
such situations will own only the capital represented by the partnership interest he gratuitously received. He can receive only that portion of partnership income attributable to the interest he now owns.
Section 704(e)(1) codifies the case law rule that income can effectively
be shifted only when the underlying capital interest that produced it has
17
6
been effectively transferred.' This capital-income or tree-fruit analysis
effectively prohibits the attribution of capital income to anyone other than
the owner of the underlying capital interest. However, section 704(e)(1)
clearly intends that a donor will not have attributed to him income from
capital if such income accrued subsequent to an effective transfer of his
ownership interest in the underlying capital asset.
With the enactment of section 704(e) in 1951, Congress abolished the
so-called "original capital" requirement of prior law for partnerships
where capital is a material income-producing factor.'8 Additionally, Congress intended that taxpayers who successfully negotiated their way into
this non-exclusive safe harbor would not have their status as partners
denied solely because they had tax avoidance as a motive. 9
Although section 704(e) does not apply to partnerships in which
capital is not a material income-producing factor, where the section does

12. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
13. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2).
14. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920).
15. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2).
16. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
17. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
18. During the 1940's many courts refused to recognize family members as
partners if their partnership interests were derived by gift from other family
members. Theirs was not "original capital." Case law (Culbertson v. United
States, 337 U.S. 733 (1949)) and later statute (I.R.C. § 704(e)) abolished this
partner-recognition requirement for it did not respect the principle that income
from property is attributable to such property. See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R.
WHITMIRE, supra note 10, 14.01[1].
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(x) (1976). However, the presence or absence
of a tax-avoidance motive is one of many factors to be considered in determining
the reality of the ownership of a capital interest acquired by gift.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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apply it attributes partnership status to anyone who complies with20 its conditions, regardless of family relationship or the absence thereof.
A taxpayer will be recognized as a partner, for federal income tax purposes, if two requirements are met. They include:
(1) he must own a capital interest in a partnership, and
(2) such partnership must be one in which capital is a material
income producing factor.
Where these requirements are met there should be less reliance upon
or significance given to the subjective intent of the donor or donee involved
in the gratuitous transfer of a partnership interest. 21 This represents a considerable qualification of prior law, 22 which remains viable for partnerships in which capital is not a material income-producing factor.
Satisfaction of the materiality and ownership requirements of section
704(e) has not resulted in partner recognition to the extent intended by
Congress. The Internal Revenue Service and the courts, in efforts to prevent tax avoidance, have simply refused to allow section 704(e) to operate
as a safe harbor. These tribunals have made the law impotent by administrative and judicial fiat. By intentionally exceeding lawful endeavor
they have undermined section 704(e), frustrated legislative intent, and
created a trap for the unwary. Legislated mandate should prevail over inconsistent judicial or administrative efforts, particularly where the consequence of such inconsistent efforts is a quagmire of uncertainty. Congress
should act to remove such unauthorized and unwarranted deterrents to
partnership transactions and lend certainty to the partner recognition
question.
A.

The MaterialIncome-ProducingFactorRequirement

This requirement provides that partner recognition will not be allowed, for federal income tax purposes, by operation of section 704(e) unless a
substantial portion of the partnership's gross income was attributable to
the employment of capital in the business. 23 Generally, partnerships
24
engaged in personal services businesses will not meet this requirement.
However, such a partnership may meet this requirement if a substantial
portion of its gross income is attributable to the financing of accounts
receivable or contracts, or to the partnership's acquisition of good will. 25
20. Although I.R.C. § 704(e) bears the heading "Family Partnerships" the
partner-recognition rule of I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) applies to an interest received by
purchase or gift from "any other person." See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R.
WHITMIRE, supra note 10, at
14.01[5].
21. See Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971); W. MCKEE,
W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 10, at 14.02[3].
22.

Culbertson v. Commissioner, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).

23. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii) (1976).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv) (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
25.

Id.
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This materiality requirement reflects Congress' intent that partnership
income be treated in accordance with several fundamental principles of
federal income taxation, including:
(1) income from personal services is attributable to the person
who rendered the personal services; and
(2) income from
property is attributable to the owner of such
26
property.
Where capital is not a material income-producing factor in a partnership's
business, income derived from the business is generated from personal services, rather than from property, and should be attributed to those who
performed the personal services. 27 This result will not be avoided by conducting a personal services business in partnership form and giving partnership interests and income to persons other than those who performed
the services. Such income-assignment attempts are not effective to shift the
recognition of income from those who in fact earned it.28 However, where

capital is a material income-producing factor, each partner, as an owner
of an interest in the capital, has a right to the part of such partnership income which that capital produces 2 9
A close analysis of two cases, Ketter v. Commissioner" and Carriage
Square, Inc. v. Commissioner,31 both decided recently, will serve to illustrate the parameters of this materiality condition precedent to partner
recognition under the non-exclusive safe harbor provision of section
704(e). Such analysis will also indicate the extent to which the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts have gone to frustrate congressional intent
in this area.
First, consider the case of Ketter v. Commissioner,32 in which the taxpayer had conducted an accounting practice as a sole proprietorship for
several years. He ultimately employed sixteen persons in his business. In
1968, the taxpayer created eight irrevocable trusts. The taxpayer's six
minor children were each made a beneficiary of one of the eight trusts,
with St. Benedict's College made beneficiary of the other two. The taxpayer's brother-in-law was the initial trustee of all eight trusts. A local
bank was designated successor trustee for the first six trusts and the taxpayer's eldest living child above age twenty-one was designated successor
co-trustee with the bank for the other two trusts.
26. S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 39; H.R. REP. No. 586, 82nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951). See also W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE,
supra note 10, at 14.01[2].
27. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
28. Poggetto v. United States, 306 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1962); Ketter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 637 (1978).
29. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii) (1976). See cases cited
note 3 supra.

30.

70 T.C. 637 (1978).

32.

70 T.C. 637 (1978).

31.by University
69 T.C. of119
(1977).
Published
Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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The indentures for the six trusts created for the benefit of the
taxpayer's children precluded the taxpayer from borrowing money from
the trusts, directly or indirectly, without adequate interest or security. Sole
control over these trusts was vested in the trustee, who had broad powers,
including the authority to form a partnership to provide certain services to
certified public accountants. Trust income was payable to its beneficiary
for life, after reaching age twenty-one, or could be accumulated at the
beneficiary's election. No trust income could be used in any way to satisfy
the taxpayer's obligation to support his minor children. Other provisions
related to these trusts and those created for the benefit of St. Benedict's
College, not relevant here, were made by trust indenture.
Each trust was assigned an undivided one-eighth interest in a portion
of the "work in progress" of the taxpayer's existing accounting firm and the
employment contracts held by him with employees in his firm. These
transfers were valid under state law.
On the same day the trusts were created, the trustee formed a partnership among the eight trusts which bore the taxpayer's name, although the
taxpayer was not a partner. The "work in progress" and the employment
contracts, which had been assigned to the trusts, were reassigned to the
newly formed partnership. The partnership agreement, valid under state
law, gave each partner equal management rights.
On the same day the trusts and the partnership were created, the partnership contracted with the taxpayer, as independent contractor, to provide him certain accounting services. The taxpayer agreed to pay the partnership seventy-three percent of the standard billing rate for services it
performed. This agreement also provided that the taxpayer would provide
the partnership with services for which he would be compensated on a
reasonable time and expense basis.
The partnership began operations with sixteen employees and expanded to thirty over several years. Its billing practice and overhead
necessitated borrowing working capital from time to time. The trustee
devoted approximately fourteen hours per year to the trust's partnership
business for which he received as compensation between fifty and seventyfive dollars annually.
The Commissioner refused to recognize the partnership for income tax
purposes, attributed the partnership income to the taxpayer, and assessed
a deficiency in his federal income tax. The tax court upheld the Commissioner's action and resolved that the partnership, composed of eight trusts
established by a taxpayer for the benefit of his six minor children and his
alma mater, would not be recognized for federal income tax purposes
33
under section 704(e).
The court observed that section 704(e)(1) imposes two requirements
for recognition as a partner: (1) the partnership must be one in which
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
33. Id. at 651.
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capital is a "material income-producing factor," and (2) the person must
"own" the partnership interest.3 4 The court concluded, after considering
36
all facts and circumstances, 5 that neither requirement was met.
With respect to the materiality requirement, the court after discussing
applicable statutes, case law, and regulations, turned to the relevant facts.
Virtually all of the partnership income constituted compensation for services rendered by partnership employees. The partnership maintained no
inventory. Relative to its income level the partnership owned very little
equipment. The taxpayer's reputation brought in the partnership's
business. Such facts do not suggest that this partnership was one in which
capital was a material income-producing factor. The Ketter court concluded that the "work in progress" did not constitute a material incomeproducing factor.3 7 Neither did the employee contracts3 8 nor the necessity
to borrow capital satisfy the materiality requirement. 39 The court
acknowledged that such capital items may be sufficient to satisfy the
materiality requirements for partnerships engaged in the distribution, sale
40
and merchandising of products in the ordinary course of business.
However, such partnerships were considered appreciably different in kind
'41
from "personal service partnerships.
The court resolved that "it was neither the employment contracts, nor
the work in progress, nor the small amount of equipment which enabled
the partnership to produce income. '42 Its income depended upon the taxpayer. Consequently, capital was not a material income-producing
factor.

43

While Ketter is arguably sound in its resolution of the materiality question, its application to the income-assignment principle raises serious
questions. Does Ketter suggest that a professional services partnership
must always allocate income to its earner? What about the bright young
lawyer or accountant who generates more income from his services than he
is paid by his partnership? May the partners attribute such income to him
for federal income tax purposes? Does Ketter support an employee action
for earned but unpaid income? Does ownership of an interest in a personal
services partnership no longer ensure the owner a share of partnership pro34. Id. at 643-44.
35. This is required byTreas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1), (2) (1976). See Ballou v.
United States, 370 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967);
Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962); Acuffv. Commissioner,
35 T.C. 162 (1960), affd per curiam, 296 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961).
36. 70 T.C. 637, 651 (1978).
37. Id. at 646.
38. Id. at 647.
39. Id. at 645.
40. Id. at 646.
41. Id.
Published42.
by University
Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
Id. at of647.

43.

Id.
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fits? Will Ketter subject the salary level of partnership employees to increasing judicial scrutiny? To my mind, these are legitimate questions in
light of Ketter.
That practical reality has been eschewed for conceptual nicety was
more boldly illustrated in the case of CarriageSquare, Inc. v. Commissioner.44 In CarriageSquare, the taxpayer was a corporation. The taxpayer and its principal owner, Condiotti, were both in the -real estate
development business. Condiotti gave $5,000 to his mother. On February
14, 1969, Condiotti's mother established five trusts, one each for the
benefit of Condiotti, his wife, and his three minor children, using $1,000
of the gift money as the corpus of each trust.
Barlow, Condiotti's tax adviser and owner of the remaining shares of
the taxpayer corporation, was named trustee of each trust. On the same
day they were established, the trusts, as limited partners, and the taxpayer, as general partner, entered into a limited partnership agreement.
The purpose of the partnership was to acquire and develop residential property and to do such business under the name of Sonoma Development
Company. The taxpayer contributed $556 of its capital and each trust
contributed its $1,000. Each trust received an eighteen percent interest in
Sonoma and the taxpayer received a ten-percent interest. The trusts were
not obliged to contribute any additional capital to Sonoma and, as limited
45 As
partners, each trust's liability was limited to its capital 4contribution.
6
unlimited.
was
liability
taxpayer's
the
general partner,
From its establishment, Sonoma had the ability to borrow from a bank
all of the money necessary to finance a real estate development and construction project. By employing borrowed capital, Sonoma profitably
engaged in the business of having homes built and sold. Condiotti and his7
4
wife gave a continuing guarantee for several Sonoma construction loans.

Sonoma's income for the three years in question in CarriageSquare
was allocated at a rate of eighteen percent to each of the five trusts for an
aggregate figure of ninety percent, and ten percent to the taxpayer. The
income for this period to the taxCommissioner allocated all of Sonoma's
48
payer and assessed a deficiency.
The Commissioner's action was based upon his determination that
Sonoma's income was earned solely by the services performed and the
financial risks assumed by the taxpayer. 49 The court in CarriageSquare

was not a material income-producing factor in
concluded that capital
5°
business.
Sonoma's
44.

69 T.C. 119 (1977).

45.

UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.

46.

Id. § 9.

47,.

69 T.C. 119, 123 (1977).

48. Id. at 124.
49. Id. at 126.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
50. Id. at 127.
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The court noted that Sonoma's initial capital contribution was $5,556,
and that it earned $322,942 during its first three years. Further, the court
conceded that borrowed capital may be "capital" for section 704(e)(1) purposes, but held that it was not in this case. 5'
The court observed that the taxpayer, as Sonoma's only general partner, was the only partner in Sonoma whose liability for repayment of such
borrowed capital was not substantially limited. 52 Perhaps it escaped the
court's attention that this is true in any limited partnership that has one
53
general partner.

The court also noted that Sonoma would have been unable to secure
the borrowed capital it employed in its real estate business without the continuing guarantee executed by Condiotti.5 4 Apparently, Condiotti's
behavior was imputed to the taxpayer by the court. It could have been as
soundly imputed to the trust established for Condiotti's benefit or to him
personally. It would seem consistent with a general partner's duty to its
limited partnership for it to secure needed capital on mutually agreeable
terms from whatever sources available. Nothing inherent in such conduct
would preclude a finding that capital was a material income-producing
factor in the partnership business. 55

Finally, the court reasoned that "[s]ince Sonoma made a large profit
with a very small capital contribution from its partners, and was able to
borrow, and did borrow, substantially all of the capital which it employed
in its business upon the condition that such loans were guaranteed by nonpartners," section 1.704-1(e)(1)(i) of the income tax regulations prohibits
the borrowed capital involved in CarriageSquare from being considered
as a "material income-producing factor. '5 6 The regulations require such
'57
capital to be "contributed by the partners.
It is interesting to note that no such qualifying language can be found
in section 704(e) itself. A literal reading of its provisions in no way supports
the Service's regulation requirement, or the court's reliance upon it to find
that capital was not a material income-producing factor in Sonoma's
business. .1

A concurring opinion in CarriageSquare, adopted by six judges, while
generally agreeing with the result, did not agree with the majority's conclusion that borrowed capital was not a material income-producing factor

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
54. Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119, 127 (1977).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv) (1976).
56. Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119, 127 (1977).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(i) (1976).
I.R.C. of§ Missouri
704(e)(1);
Treas.
§ 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii),
Published58.
by University
School
of LawReg.
Scholarship
Repository, 1979 (iv) (1976). See also
note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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in the Sonoma limited partnership. 59 Additionally, it opined that the majority opinion was "out of touch with reality" 60 and observed that borrowed
capital is invariably employed in real estate developments. 6' Moreover,
this same opinion observed that the rationale adopted by the majority was
"gratuitous," not being presented by the Commissioner nor argued by
either party.6 2 It characterized the majority's emphasis upon the unlimited
liability of the general partner (taxpayer) as distinguished from the limited
liability of the limited partners (trust) as a meaningless distinction6 3 and its
approach to the tax avoidance problem as "strained. 64 The concurring
opinion reasoned for "an alternative which is less dangerous, supported
completely by the regulations and in harmony with the Congressional intent of section 704(e). 6 5
A partially dissenting opinion which carried five judges in Carriage
Square declared that "capital was clearly a material income-producing
factor in the business of Sonoma .... "66 Whether such capital was contributed by the partners or borrowed by the partnership is not relevant to
this determination.6 7 What does matter is the function served by capital
(from whatever source) employed in the business conducted by the partnership .61
A second dissenting opinion concluded that the majority's approach
"does violence to the previously well-understood meaning of 'capital as a
material income-producing factor."' 69 It viewed the notion that borrowed
capital should not be considered in determining whether capital is a
material income-producing factor as a "hitherto-undreamed-of
principle,"70 and counseled against "trying to make statutory phrases do
71
more than they were designed for.
At least one reaction to the CarriageSquare decision has been forceful
and direct. 72 Administrative or judicial sensitivity towards the use of the
family partnership as an income splitting device and tax avoidance in this
area is understandable. However, improper legislating by these tribunals
is not, particularly where it frustrates congressional intent.
59.

Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119, 130 (1977) (Goffe,

J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 131.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 139, 141 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting in part).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 141, 142 (Hall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 142.
71. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
72. See Blount, Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner: Family Partnership, Section 704(e) andJudicialLegislation, 14 GA. ST. BARJ. 179 (1978).
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The court's action in Carriage Square is unfortunate for practical
reasons. Sonoma was engaged in the real estate business. The real estate
industry has traditionally enjoyed preferred treatment in the Internal
Revenue Code. 73 Carriage Square, if allowed to stand, will frustrate
federal policy and law designed to facilitate capital formation in this
area. 74 The real estate industry, in all its aspects, relies extensively upon
borrowed capital in its operations. Thus, capital is invariably a material
income-producing factor in the real estate business. Against these considerations, as suggested earlier, the CarriageSquare decision is "out of
7
touch with reality."

-

CarriageSquare judicially legislates an "at-risk" rule for limited partners in family partnerships in which capital is a material incomeproducing factor. It was of no significance to this court that a limited partner, by definition, enjoys limited liability. Further, it did not matter that
capital contributed to a partnership is often insufficient to meet business
needs or that borrowing needed working capital is a highly developed propensity of the business community. To hold that borrowed money does not
constitute capital when a real estate partnership is concerned constitutes
self-deception or a rejection of reality. Lastly, it should be noted that the
majority's feeble attempt to limit its holding to the facts of the case is not
compelling.76

B.

The CapitalInterest Ownership Requirement

Section 704(e)(1) requires the ownership of a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor before a
taxpayer will be recognized as a partner. "Capital interest" as employed in
section 704(e)(1) means "an interest in the assets of the partnership, which
is distributable to the owner of the capital interest upon his withdrawl
from the partnership or upon liquidation of the partnership. 77 The mere
right to participate in partnership earnings and profits does not qualify as
a capital interest. Capital interests in such partnerships must be acquired
in valid transactions, and the donee or purchaser must be the real owner of
such interest.78 A transfer will be recognized if it vests dominion and control of the partnership interest in the transferee. 79 Whether such dominion
and control is vested in the trustee is a fact question to be determined after
consideration of all facts and circumstances. 80 Transactions between fami73.

See I.R.C. §§ 44, 48(a)(8), 121, 167(k), 191, 465, 804(c)(2), 856-860,

74.

Id.

1 2 50(g).

75.

See text accompanying note 60 supra.

76. Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119, 127 (1977).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v) (1976).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (1976).
Published
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79.by University
Id.
80. Id.
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ly members will be closely scrutinized, and transfers will not be recognized
where the transferor retains such elements of ownership that the transferee
has not acquired full and complete ownership of the partnership interest."1
Analysis in this area requires consideration of the transaction as a
whole. Isolated facts will not be determinative.8 2 An analytical focal point
here is the degree of control over the partnership retained by the
transferor.8 3 Significant controls include retention of control or restriction
84
over distribution of income attributable to partnership interest involved,
85
limitation of the right of the transferee to liquidate or sell his interest,
retention of control over assets essential to the business,8 6 and retention of
management powers inconsistent with normal relationships among partners .87
Indirect control inconsistent with transferee ownership of a capital interest in a partnership may preclude partner recognition for federal income tax purposes as well.88 Indirect control is often effectuated through
separate business organizations, estates, trusts, individuals or other partnerships. 8 9
Substantial transferee participation in the management and control of
partnership business9" and receipt of his distributive share of partnership
income9" constitutes strong evidence that the transferee possesses dominion and control over his capital interest and that such interest is real. The
absence of participation by a limited partner in the management of a
92
limited partnership, of course, will not preclude partner recognition. If
the reality of the transfer is established, the motives for the transaction are
93
generally immaterial.
Retained controls that are incidental to a business relationship be94
tween transferee and transferor may not preclude partner recognition.
Additionally, where retained controls are exercisable for the benefit of the
transferee by the transferor acting as fiduciary, partner status may be attributed to the transferee.9 5
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(i) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(a) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(c) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(d) (1976).
§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(iii) (1976).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Id.

90.

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(iv) (1976).

91. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(v) (1976).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix) (1976).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(x) (1976).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) (d) (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1953). See also
W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 10,
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Several objective factors demonstrating a transferee's control of a partnership have been listed.96 Such factors include (1) compliance with local
partnership, fictitious name and business regulation statutes, (2) control
of business bank accounts, (3) recognition of the transferree's rights in
distributions of partnership property and profits, (4) recognition of the
transferee's rights in business contracts as well as in litigation affecting the
business, (5) the existence of written instruments establishing the nature of
the partnership against and the respective rights of the respective partners,
and (6) filing of partnership tax returns as required by law.9 7
The Ketter case 98 is illustrative of the current judicial attitude toward
these ownership rules. In Ketter, the court concluded that the facts and
circumstances, considered as a whole, revealed that the taxpayer there
involved retained such incidents of dominion and control over the partnership that the trusts could not be recognized as owners of the partnership
interests under section 704(e)(1). 99
Factually, the trust partners in Ketter held legal title to their partnership interests. The taxpayer-grantor retained no reversionary interest in
trust assets. He could in no way benefit from trust income or property.
Each trust's distributive share of partnership profits was payable (and
paid) annually. Each trust partner held the right to withdraw from the
partnership or liquidate its interest therein. The partnership kept separate
books and records. It maintained and solely controlled two bank accounts.
Also, it filed its own tax returns. The partnership agreement, valid under
state law, gave each partner (trusts included) equal management rights. 100
Additional indicia of real ownership are difficult to imagine. However,
the Ketter court resolved that the controls retained by the taxpayergrantor and the manner in which the partnership's business was conducted
"clearly demonstrated" that he retained actual dominion and control sufficient to preclude recognition of the trusts as partners.10 '
The court made much of the fact that the taxpayer was the principal
manager of the partnership's business and that he managed the partnerships much like he had managed his sole proprietorship. However, the
2
court failed to observe that he did so pursuant to contractual obligation, 10
or that service as fiduciary in such instances is insufficient, standing alone,
03
to preclude partner or partnership recognition under section 704(e)(1).1
The court also viewed unfavorably the relatively small amount of time
devoted to partnership management by the sole trustee for the several trust
96.
97.
98.

W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 10, at 1 14.03[3].
Id.
Ketter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 637, 647 (1978).

99.

Id. at 647, 648, 651.

100. Id. at 638-43.
101. Id. at 648.
102. by Id.
at 641.
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partners.' 0 4 However, the court did not conclude that the trustee or the
trust partners breached any fiduciary duty owed to the partnership or each
trust individual. Apparently, the fact that the partners were paying a proven manager to perform this function escaped judicial notice. At no time
did the court suggest that the management contract between the partnership and the taxpayer was illusory, sham, or otherwise ineffectual. Lastly,
it would seem that reduced trustee involvement in partnership management, standing alone, is not sufficient to preclude partner or partnership
recognition here.
The Ketter court found that the taxpayer's independent accounting
practice was a major vehicle of control over the partnership in as much as
the partnership depended upon the taxpayer's business for work referrals.
The court reasoned that this constituted "control over assets essential to
the business,"° 5 and that "the use of a separate grantor-controlled facility
to regulate the flow of income to a partnership has frequently been found a
significant factor leading to the non-recognition of the partnership for
federal income tax purposes.

106

The court cited three cases for this latter proposition. All three are
distinguishable factually and their results are more sound conceptually
than Ketter. The first, Krause v. Commissioner,107 is significantly different factually from Ketter in that the taxpayer-grantor retained controls
over the trusts' right to transfer their partnership interest, he could remove
the trustee of each trust, and the trusts had limited durations. Additionally, the Krause opinion does not expressly refer to the "regulate the flow of
income" concept, contrary to the court's suggestion in Ketter. On balance
the ratonale of Krause does not compel the result reached in Ketter on the
retained control question.
The second case cited by -theKetter court for the proposition that the
taxpayer retained control of assets essential to the partnership's business is
also distinguishable factually and conceptually. In United States v.
Ramos, 108 no assets were transferred to the partnerships. Each partner
took a share of income assigned to it from other business activity the tax-

payer engaged. Thus, partner recognition was precluded. The distinction
between this and the Ketter situation does not warrant articulation. A naked and gratuitous income assignment transaction will never support partner recognition. 09 Ramos, like Krause, does not compel the result reached
in Ketter on the retained control question.
104. Ketter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 637, 648 (1978)
105. Id. at 649.
106. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(C) (1976)). See also Krause v.
Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974), affg 57 T.C. 890 (1972); United
States v. Ramos, 393 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968);
Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1962).
107. 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
108. 393 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
109. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
331 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Overton v. Commissioner, 162
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The last cite by the Ketter court on this question proves even less than
the first two. In Kuney v. Frank,"10 the taxpayer retained complete control
over trust income and the assets transferred to the trusts, could receive all
trust income personally, was protected from obligation by exclupatory
clauses, and retained control over the size and share of each trust's partnership interest. These facts prompted the court to reverse a jury verdict in
favor of the taxpayer and hold as a matter of law that the partners would
not be recognized. These facts are all directly opposite to those found in
Ketter. The Kuney decision clearly does not compel the result reached by
the court in Ketter on this issue.
The court's conclusion on this issue is not supported by law or fact. Its
rationale, if extended, would suggest that a professional services partnership is impermissibly controlled by its clients, or that lawyer or doctor is
controlled by client or patient. This reasoning is illustrative of the court's
decision not to allow section 704(e) to operate as the non-exclusive safe
harbor Congress intended. This exceeds legitimate judicial endeavor and
encroaches upon legislative prerogative.
The Ketter court also found evidence of the taxpayer's control over the
partnership by the manner in which its business affairs were conducted. "'1
It observed that the general public was unaware of the partnership's existence, that partnership clients viewed partnership employees as the taxpayer's employees, that the taxpayer served as the partnership's manager,
that the partnership bore the taxpayer's name, and that it failed to comply
with fictitious name statute requirements.
Although publication of partner status in business dealings is significant," 2 this alone cannot justify non-recognition of partner or partnership. " 3 Moreover, the facts clearly reflect that the partnership was not a
mere "alter ego" of the taxpayers. " 4 Lastly, all these observations made by
the court failed to reflect that the partnership benefited handsomely from
its employment of the taxpayer's services in its business, or to acknowledge
that the taxpayer had been adequately compensated for services rendered.
On balance, the court analysis and disposition of the retained ownership question in Ketter was superficial and result-oriented. It manifests the
court's propensity to cast the legislative net too broadly. One would think
that the judiciary would exercise more self-restraint.
F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947); Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.
1040); Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959); Irvine K. Furman, 45
T.C. 360 (1966), affdper curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967); Paul A. Teschner,
38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
110. 308 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1962).
111. Ketter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 637, 649 (1978).
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(vi) (1976).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(i) (1976) ("isolated facts are not determinative").
114. Neither was an alter ego theory suggested by the court's rationale in Ketter.
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CONCLUSION

It is clear that the partnership has great facility for income splitting
among family members. This has been a perennial problem for the courts
and the IRS.
These tribunals have overreacted to this tax avoidance problem by its
construction and application of the partner recognition rules where family
partnership transactions have been involved. To navigate one's way safely
into the calm waters of the safe harbor intended by Congress insures the
taxpayer nothing. Many a ship securely moored at the docks of section
704(e) have been torpedoed by the IRS or the judiciary.
This frustration of congressional intent should not be allowed to continue. If the non-exclusive safe harbor provided by section 704(e) is illadvised, Congress should make appropriate amendment to the law. It is
clear that such legislating should not occur via administrative or judicial
fiat.
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